Hersch Lauterpacht as a Positivist : Understood in the Context of the Methodological Argument (Methodenstreit) by Nishi Taira & 西 平等
Hersch Lauterpacht as a Positivist :
Understood in the Context of the
Methodological Argument (Methodenstreit)
著者 Nishi Taira
journal or
publication title
Kansai University review of law and politics
volume 29
page range 41-52
year 2008-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10112/11779
41 
Hersch Lauterpacht as a Positivist 
-Understood in the Context of the Methodological Argument (Methodenstreit) -
Taira NISHI* 
"International law is not a highly technical subject, and it would be a mistake to 
aim at giving it more technicality by the mode of treating it". John Westlake 
Hersch Lauterpacht has been regarded as one of the great opponents of positivism. 
He severely criticized the State Will doctrine which holds that the will of the state is the 
ultimate and exclusive source of law. Paradoxically however, his methodology, namely the 
construction of a complete and self-contained system of legal norms through which a lawyer 
could settle every dispute, owed much to German legal positivism. He defended the 
positivist methodology against anti-positivists, such as Hans Morgenthau. Twentieth century 
scholars of international law, such as IL.Brierly and J.Stone, criticized his methodology for 
its positivist heritage. Only by examining the positivist elements of Lauterpacht's 
methodology can we fully appreciate the significance of the arguments it has engendered. 
1. Lauterpacht and Positivism 
To the extent that the history of international law can be understood as a dichotomy 
between "positivist" and "natural law" doctrines, international legal theories in the first half 
of the twentieth century are often characterized as a "criticism of positivism" or as a 
"renaissance of natural law". Similarly Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the dominant international 
law scholars of that period, could also be described as an opponent of positivism, or as a 
proponent of "natural law" First, Lauterpacht criticized "the doctrine of rigid positivism 
according to which only rules expressly recognized by international custom and treaties are 
the exclusive sources of international law," regarding "positivism" as an aspect of the 
"doctrine of sovereignty" .1 l Second, he maintained that not only the rules to which the State 
gives its consent, but also the principles which have been established in jurisprudence — 
"general principles of law", "principles of justice" and "principles of equity"―are applicable 
in international judicial settlement2l. He further believed that the analogy of "general 
* Associate Professor of International Law, Kansai University 
1) Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, Longmans, Green and 
Co.,1927, p.43 
2) Lauterpacht regarded those principles as legal ones and clearly distinguished the aplication of them from 
non-judicial setlements ex aequo et bono. See Private Law Sources and Analogies, pp.63-67. 
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principles of private law recognized by the main systems of jurisprudence" was useful and 
necessary in international law in order to constitute a gapless system of law in this field立
For those who adhere to the dichotomy of "positivist" and "natural law" doctrines, such 
beliefs may appear to fal under the later's umbrella. After al, Lauterpacht expressly 
avoided basing international law on the will of the State, seeking instead to establish it on 
another, "higher" basis4l 
This understanding, however, is too narrow. It overlooks, for example, the fact that 
Lauterpacht was criticized in E.H.Carr's, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 (1939), as a 
utopian. Moreover, it ignores that one of the chief purposes of Lauterpacht's masterpiece, 
The Function of Law in the International Community (1933), was to refute the theory of 
Hans Morgenthau who was then an international law scholar in Europe. The dichotomy of 
"positivist" and "natural law" doctrines is of litle use to understand these arguments. 
Neither Carr nor Morgenthau can be counted as a "positivist" who only recognizes as law 
those positive laws founded on the will of State. 
In particular, Morgenthau, a lawyer from Germany, clearly grasped the significance of 
the "methodological argument (Methodenstreit)"5) in German pubic law and general State 
doctrine (allgemeine Staatslehre) between positivism and anti-positivism in the inter-war 
period, and expressed sympathy with the later's view砂 Inhis inaugural academic lecture 
before the law faculty of the University of Geneva (1932), Morgenthau tried "to fit the 
history of the German idea of State in the last thirty years into the context of general 
spiritual and political development in this period"7). He highlighted the historically 
conditioned character of Paul Laband's "seemingly nonpolitical" formalism and of the 
"logical-formal" tendency of his followers, who dedicated themselves to the task of 
constructing a logically consistent system of positive legal norms and gave up grasping the 
total reality of State in their time. s)
3) Private Law Sources and Analogies, p.85. 
4) Wilhelm G. Grewe, Epochen der Volkerechtsgeschihte, Nomos Verlagsgeselschaft, 2. Aufl., 198, p.712. 
Iain G.M.Scobbie, "The Theorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht's Concept of the International Judicial 
Function,"European Journal of International Law, vol.8, 197, pp.266-269. Lauterpacht himself caled the 
general principles of law "a modern version of the law of nature" (Lauterpacht, International Law and Human 
Rights, Stevens & Sons, 1950, p.15). 
5) On the argument and its political context, se: Michael Stoleis, Geschichte des ofentlichen Rechts zn 
Deutsch/and, 3.Bd., C.H.beck, 199, pp.153-186. 
6) Christoph Frei, Hans」Morgenthau,An Intelectual Biography, Luisiana State University Pres, 2001, 
pp.114-120. 
7) "die Geschichte des deutschen Staatsdenkens der letzten dresig Jahre in den Zusammenhang der allgemeinen 
geistigen und politischen Entwicklung dieses Zeitraums einzufilgen" ("Der Kampf der deutschen Statslehre 
um die Wirklichkeit", manuscript, box53 in the colection of Morgenthau's literary estate on the deposit at the 
Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.). 
8) "Laband iberlies die politischen Probleme, die das ofentliche recht jener Zeit aufgab, den Politikern und 
zog sich in den scheinbar unpolitischen Formalismus seines Statsrechts zurick" (Ibid., p.6). In Jelinek's system 
"die fur die statlichen Zustinde der Zeit charakteristischen Teile der statlichen Wirklichkeit…[blieben] 
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According to Morgenthau, the positivist retreat from non-juridical, and especially 
political, elements of the State had corresponded with the political context and the spirit of 
the time during Bismarck's reign when the German bourgeois (das deutsche Biirgertum) and 
their academic activities had to withdraw from the political sphere. Such a situation, he 
believed, could only be temporary立
"In aler Regel aber verlangt ein elementares Bediirfnis der Menschen nach 
sinngebender Erklarung und wertender Rechtfertigung der Ordnung, die wir 
Staat nennen, und zwar nicht einer abstrakten Sollordnung, deren einzelne 
Teile sich nach formal-logischen Gesichtspunkten systematisieren lassen, 
sondern der konkreten,wirkenden Lebensordnung, als welche jene abstrakte 
Ordnung in unser Leben bestimmend eingreift."10) 
It was no wonder then that young scholars after the First World War, such as Erich 
Kaufmann, Rudolf Smend and Carl Schmitt, criticized the positivist method, arguing that it 
could not capture the reality of the State. Morgenthau interpreted Schmitt's introduction of 
the concept of the political into legal thought as an unsuccessful effort "to theoretically 
comprehend the reality of State",11) which had been excluded by positivists from the sphere 
of legal theory. 
Such an anti-positivist concern was shared by Morgenthau himself. In his first book 
published in 192912), he attempted to establish a theoretical basis for the concept of the 
political dispute, which had been often invoked by international law theorists in order to 
limit the scope of international judicial function13). He denied "the dominant theory 
imprisoned by the positivist prejudice, according to which juridical problems could be 
resolved only by the interpretation of positive law."14) For Morgenthau, only the reality of 
unverarbeitet" (p.8). "[Kelsen] beschriinkt sich . darauf, die File des geltenden positiven offentlichen Rechts 
in ein nach bestimmten formalen Gesichtspunkten logisch geordnetes System zu bringen." "die Staatslehre 
Kelsens [ist] . ausschliesslich an eine logisch-normative Methode gebunden" (p.14). 
9) Ibid., pp.5-6, 15-16. 
10) lbid.,p.16 
11) Ibid., p.20 
12) Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen, Universitiitsverlag von Robert Noske. The 
revised French version of this book is: La notion du "politique" et la theorie des difi. 釘endsinternationaux, 
Recueil Sirey, 1933. 
13) The doctrine of the political dispute had its basis in treaties, although they did not explicitly refer to the 
"political dispute" itself. Many of the international arbitration treaties concluded during the first four decades 
of the twentieth century distinguished disputes of a legal nature from other ones, and regarded only the former 
as justiciable; e.g. article 1 of the arbitration convention of Germany with Belgium (Locarno, 1925): "All 
disputes of every kind between Germany and Belgium with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to 
their respective rights .. shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice . ". 
14) La notion du "politique", pp.37-38. 
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State relations, not positive laws, could provide a sound basis for the concept of political 
dispute. 
Looking to base the concept on the reality of international relations, Morgenthau made 
a distinction between "tensions (Spannungen)" and "disputes (Streitigkeiten)." Disputes are 
"the collisions between States, which find a precise, clearly formulated expression in the 
form of claim and objection to the claim." The object of a dispute is rationally formulated 
such that it is possible to decide and settle it on the basis of generally applicable norms15l. 
According to Morgenthau, a State does not always rationally base its conduct on these 
norms. Instead, driven by an impulse to attain a higher status in international society, a state 
often aspires to change the normative status quo. Such an irrational aspiration causes 
another kind of collision between states. In contrast to disputes, "tensions" are defined as 
"those collisions between States, which are concerned with a discrepancy, claimed by one 
State in proportion to another State, between the present legal status and the actual power 
arrangement."16) Tensions cannot be resolved "on the basis of the positive international law, 
or any other system of norms susceptible of general application."17) 
A dispute does not always arise independently of a tension. Morgenthau thought that 
the two kinds of collisions often influence each other. Sometimes a part of a tension is 
rationally formulated and integrated into the domain of a dispute, and sometimes a dispute 
represents a tension which itself is not expressed explicitly18l. Morgenthau defined a 
political dispute as a dispute that is connected to a tension (eine Streitigkeit, die in Verb ind-
ung mit einer Spannung steht)19) Here it should be noted that he did not deny the possibility 
of resol可nga political dispute by application of legal norms. Rather, he admitted that 
judges could decide any political dispute on the basis of generally applicable norms — 
whether of positive international laws, of the general principles of law, or of analogy to 
another advanced legal system— so long as even the political dispute is rationally 
formulated as a dispute. However, a decision based on these norms would never lead to a 
satisfactory solution to the underlying tension in a dispute. If a court dared to decide a 
political dispute, it would either focus on the State's rationally expressed points without 
acknowledging a related tension, or introduce some irrational elements in order to decide 
about an underlying tension, the whole of which cannot be rationally formulated. In either 
case, the court would lose the trust of States. In the latter case, the court would deviate from 
15) "[Die Streitigkeiten] sind die zwischenstaatlichen Gegensatze, die in der Form von Forderung und Bestreitung 
der Forderung einen prazisen, klar formulierten Ausdruck finden, und die… ohne Ausnahme Gegenstand eines 
internationalen Prozess werden konnen, da die Begriindung der Parteivorbringen dem Bereich der allgemeiner 
Anwendung fahigen Normen entnommen sind" Die internationale Rechtspflege, p.73). 
16) "diejenigen zwischenstaatlichen Gegensatze . , die eine von einem Stat im Verhaltnis zu einem anderen 
Stat behauptete Diskrepanz zwischen der bestehenden Rechtslage und dem tatsachlichen Krafteverhaltnis zum 
Inhalt haben"(Die internationale Rechtspflege, p. 78) 
17) La notion du "politique ", pp73-74, emphasis by TN. 
18) Die internationale Rechtsp_りege,pp80-83; La notion du "politique ", pp.80-84 
19) Die internationale Rechtspflege, p.87 
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its role as judicial organ. In the former, the court could not setle the entire collision and 
might even exacerbate the problem叫 Lossof trust is fatal, especially to a international 
court, because: 
"Die Wirksamkeit eines jeden Rechtspflegeorgans, insbesondere eines 
solchen, <las seinen Geltungsgrund in dem Willen der Rechtsunterworfenen 
selbst hat, hangt von dem Vertrauen ab, das ihm die Rechtsunterworfenen 
entgegenbnngen. "21) 
Morgenthau concluded that we must deny the justiciability of a political dispute, even 
though a court can rationally come to a decision about every international dispute. 
By demonstrating the limited function of international justice, Morgenthau maintained 
that it was necessary to introduce the reality of state relations into legal thought, and that 
this could not simply be subsumed under a complete logically constructed system of legal 
norms. The application of systematically constructed legal norms cannot, or should not, 
solve every 111ternational dispute. Of course, such an argument squarely conflicts with 
Lauterpacht's view. Lauterpacht was filed with a desire to achieve "peace through court" 
and focused his efforts on realizing the universal application of judicial settlement. He 
thought that the two main tasks of international lawyers in his day were first to abandon the 
"distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable or legal and political disputes"22) and 
then to "develop an attitude of criticism in regard to the…argument that law is not a 
panacea" which is "able to secure peace in al circumstances."23) 
According to Lauterpacht, judicial process is the most important element for the 
establishment of rule of law and peace, because it is not "the existence of a sufficient body 
of clear rules of conduct" but of "a judge competent to decide upon disputed rights and to 
command peace" which is essential to the existence of law.24) In The Function of Law in 
the International Community Lauterpacht tried to establish the possibility of universal 
international justice by demonstrating the completeness of the international legal system 
and the justiciability of every international dispute. In this sense Lauterpacht defended the 
positivist method against anti-positivists who criticized its logical-normative thinking, and 
who pointed out the limited usefulness and applicability of a logically constructed 
"complete" legal system. That Lauterpacht adopted a positivist position in his methodology, 
can be better understood if one looks at his argument about a gapless system of law. 
20) Ibid., p.87-90 
21) Ibid., p.84. 
22) Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, Clarendon Press, 1933, pp.434-435. 
23) Ibid, p.437 
24) Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community Clarendon Press, 1933, p.424. Cf Scobbie, 
op.cit. n.4, p.270 
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2. Negation of lacunae in the Positivist Methodology 
For Lauterpacht, completeness is an "a priori assumption of every system of law," and 
"it is inconceivable that a court should pronounce a non liquet because of the absence of 
law."25) The completeness of the international legal order was essential for his project of 
"peace though court," because otherwise a court would not be able to settle every 
international dispute through an application of the law. 
In this argument, he named "the positivist doctrine" as his enemy. According to 
Lauterpacht, the insistence on the admissibility of judicial non liquet is "the logical 
consummation of positivist doctrine."26) If "only rules expressly recognized by international 
custom and treaties" were the exclusive sources of international law,27) then as long as 
treaties and customary laws remained partial and fragmentary, there would always be gaps 
in international law. For this reason, Lauterpacht argued, positivism is flawed. 
The fragmentary nature of positive rules, however, is not fatal to his project at al. 
Lauterpacht thought he could construct a complete legal system of such rules, with the help 
of general principles which could be amply supplied by analogy to "general principles of 
private law recognized by the main systems of jurisprudence."28) 
"There may be gaps in a statute or in the statutory law as a whole; there 
may be gaps in the various manifestations of customary law. There are no 
gaps in the legal system taken as a whole."29) 
One might think that such a systematic method is a powerful counterargument to 
positivism. Yet, an almost identical passage is found in a book30l by Paul Laband, a 
representative of German public legal positivism in the nineteenth century叫
"Gesetze konnen lilckenhaft sein, die Rechtsordnung selbst aber kann ebenso 
wenig eine Lucke haben, wie die Ordnung der Natur."32) 
In other words, the belief that there are no gaps in the legal system even though there may 
be gaps in statutory laws, was not the expression of anti-positivism but of positivism in 
25) Lauterpacht, The Function of Law, p.64. 
26) Ibid., p.65. 
27) Private Law Sources and Analogies, p.43. 
28) Ibid., p.85. 
29) Lauterpacht, The Function of Law, p.64. 
30) Paul Laband, Das Budgetrecht, unveranderter Nachdruck der 1.Auflage aus dem Jahr 1871, Walter de Gruyter, 
1971. It was originaly published as an article in Zeitschrft fur Gesetzbgebung und Rechtspjlege in Preussen 
Bd.4, 1870. 
31) Michael Stoleis, Geschichte des ofentlichen Rechts in Deutsch/and, 2. Bd., C. H. beck, 1992, pp.341-348 
32) Laband, Das Budgetrecht, p.75. 
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German legal history. 
Laband's book, das Budgetrecht, concerns the Prussian constitutional conflict (Verfas-
sungskonflikt). In the early 1860's a serious conflict arose when the overwhelmingly liberal 
assembly (Landtag), which opposed military reform, refused to approve the budget 
introduced by the Prussian monarch and his followers. The then valid 1850 Prussian 
Constitution had no provision explicitly regulating what should happen if the budget failed 
to win approval and did not come into efect. The liberal majority of the assembly advocated 
as an appropriate interpretation of the Constitution an "Appelltheorie"(theory of appeal) , 
according to which the king can only either dismiss his Ministry or dissolve the assembly 
to appeal to the electorate. However, Bismarck, who had been appointed by the king during 
the crisis as the new prime minister, appealed to "Liickentheorie" (theory of gap), which 
held that the Constitution could offer no legal solution to the conflict. Bismarck avoided 
discussion about possible interpretations of the Constitution, and simply justified the 
budget-less government by the necessity that the state should continue to exist. The conflict 
itself was ended by Bismarck's political victory in 1866, but the theoretical questions were 
left unsettled. 3 l 
Although the Prussian constitutional conflict centered on the struggle for sovereignty 
between the prince and the assembly, Laband treated the issue without reference to any 
"political" issues. Political questions, such as whether monarchical or popular sovereignty 
should be established, were foreign to his jurisprudence. He restricted his research to 
interpretation of existing constitutional law. The 1850 Constitution had very simple budget 
regulations34) and provided no guidance in the case of the assembly's refusing to approve 
a budget. Failure to lay down a rule covering the case, Laband admitted, meant that the 
constitutional statute (Verfassungs-Urkunde) had a gap. For Laband, however, it did not 
mean that the Constitution of the State had a gap, for the legal order is gapless even when 
statutes are incomplete. He maintained that in the case of a gap in the statute we should 
draw the settlement of the debatable problem from more general principles of law.35) 
Through logical operations of legal principles and concepts, such as the distinction 
between the statute in the substantive sense and in the formal sense, classification of budget 
into the administration (Verwaltungsakt), and necessary conformity of administration to law, 
Laband demonstrated the limited competence of the assembly. He showed that the right of 
the assembly to amend, or to refuse, a budget should be restricted, that the assembly had a 
obligation to approve a considerable part of budget introduced by the government and that 
33) Concerning the Prussian constitutional conflict, se: Dietmar Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 
3.Auflage, C.H.Beck, 1997, pp.250-252; Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German 
Constitutional Law, Duke UP, 1997, pp.16-19. 
34) "Aile Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Staats miissen ftir jedes Jahr im Voraus veranschlagt und auf den 
Staatshaushalts-Etat gebracht werden. Letzterer wird jahrlich durch ein Gesetz festgestellt" (the article 99). 
35) "Die Liickenhaftigkeit der Verfassungs-Urkunde nothigt .. nur dazu, die Entscheidung der streitigen Frage 
aus allgemeineren Rechtsprizipien abzuleiten" (Laband, Das Budgetrecht, p.76) 
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the approval by the assembly of a budget was not a necessary condition for governmental 
revenue collection and expenditure36). Laband, a representative positivist, thus justified 
Bismarck's budget-less government though his gap-filling interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
The general concepts of law (die allgemeinen Rechtsbegriffe) are the essential elements 
for Laband's jurisprudence. For him, positive laws are made through the application and 
combination of general concepts of law, and every legal institute is to be subordinated to 
"a higher and more general concept of law."37) It is the task of his jurisprudence to ascribe 
each legal rule to a more general concept and, on the other hand, to derive the consequence 
from this concept38). Moreover Laband seemed to rely on analogy with private law39), 
although Lauterpacht asserted that the positivist school rejects such analogies.40) Laband 
himself declared that in his book about German public law he would use the general 
concepts of law which had been developed in the field of private law. 
"Auf dem Gebiet des Staatsrechts [kehren] zahlreiche Begriffe wieder…, 
welche ihre wissenschaftliche Feststellung und Durchbildung zwar auf dem 
Gebiete des Privatrechts gefunden haben, welche ihrem Wesen nach aber 
nicht Begriffe des Privatrechts, sondern allgemeine Begriff e des Rechtes 
sind."41) 
In short, Laband, as a positivist, thought that jurists should make a legal system gap less 
with the help of general principles or concepts of law, which can sometimes be elaborated 
by analogy with private law, so that they can logically and objectively produce an appropriate 
decision about every problem, even when there is an apparent gap in statutory laws. How 
similar is this position to that of Lauterpacht, who has been regarded as an opponent of 
36) Walter Pauly carefuly analyzes the complicated argument in Das Budgetrecht: Pauly, Der Methodenwandel 
im deutschen Spatkonstitutionalismus, Ein Beitrag zu Entwicklung und Gestalt der Wisenschaft vom Ofentlichen 
Recht im 19.Jahrhundert, J.C.B.Mohl, 193, pp.177-186. For a concise explanation in English, se: Peter C. 
Caldwel, op.cit. n.3, p. 19-21. 
37) According to Laband, the general concepts of law are universaly aplicable as "the logical categories" and 
shared among al legal orders. Particularity of each legal order is produced not by diferent concepts so much 
as by the diferent ways the same general concepts are aplied and combined. "Eigentimlich ist der deutschen 
Verfassung, sowie jeder konkreten Rechtsbildung, nur die tatsichliche Verwendung und Verbindung der 
allgemeinen Rechtsbegrife; dagegen ist die Schaffung eines neuen Rechtsinstitutes, welches einem hoheren 
und allgemeineren Rechtsbegriff iberhaupt nicht untergeordnet werden kan, gerade so unmoglich wie die 
Erfindung einer neuen logischen Kategorie oder die Entstehhung einer neuen Naturkraft."(Laband, Das Sta-
atsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 1.Bd.,1.Aufl., 1876, Vorwort) 
38) Laband, Das Statsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, l. Bd., 2. Aufl., 187, Vorwort. 
39) Laband was criticized by a contemporary for the analogy of public law with civil law: Michael Stoleis, 
op.cit. n.31, p. 346-347. 
40) Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies, p.7. 
41) Laband, op.cit. n.37, Vorwort. 
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positivism? 
3. Positivism in Other Branches of Law 
Lauterpacht himself was aware that his characterization of the positivist doctrine was 
not applicable to what was called positivism in the fields of private and public law. He 
admitted that "the positivist doctrine in international law resembles only in name the 
corresponding tendencies in other branches of law" and that "[i]n other branches of law it
is the essence of positivism that it denies the existence of gaps in the law."42l 
In fact, in German legal history, the postulate of completeness of the legal order was 
not contradicted by positivists but by anti-positivists. For example Hermann Heller, in the 
context of critici刀ngthe positivism, wrote: 
"[Die] Vorstellung von der Rechtsordnung als einem einheitlichen, 
geschlossennen, liickenlosen System von Rechts函tzen[ist] eine historisch-
soziokgisch hochst voraussetzungsvolle Denkweise."43) 
"Die juristische Forderung der Luckenlosigkeit des rechtlichen N ormbestandes 
ist… nicht, wie die Normlogiker wollen, ein apriorisches Postulat des 
Juristen, sondern kann sinnvoll erst und nur innerhalb der modernen 
Staatsorganisation erhoben und nur von und in ihr bis zu einem gewissen 
Grade erfullt werden."44) 
The methodology called "legal positivism (Rechtspositivismus)" is said to have first 
appeared, at least in German legal history, in the field of private law. The historical school 
developed by C.v.Savigny "had applied the greater part of its force to the construction of a 
systematic science of civil law"45) despite the fact that its creed seems to contradict rational 
systematization of laws.46) Such a tendency was inherited and strengthened by "Pandekten-
wissenschaft," whose methodology is called "positivism" in German private legal history.47) 
Franz Wieacker indicates two points about positivism. 
"Eine gegebene Rechtsordnung ist stets ein geschlossenes System von 
Institutionen und Rechtssatzen, und zwar unabhangig von der sozialen 
42) Lauterpacht, The Function of Law, p.67 
43) Hermann Heller, Staatslehre, A.W.Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., 1934, p.265. 
44) Ibid., p.267. 
45) Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 2. Aufl., Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1996, p.430. 
46) Walter Wilhelm, Zur juristischen Methodenlehre im 19.Jahrhundert, Vittorio Klostermann, 1958, pp.57-
63. 
47) Wieacker, op.cit. n.45, p.430-431 
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Realitat der <lurch die Institutionen und Rechtssatze geregelten 
Lebensverhaltnisse."48) 
"Das System des rechtswissenschaftlichen Positivismus ist ein geschlossenes 
System; es beansprucht seinem Begriff nach Luckenlosigkeit."49) 
Positivism, which called for the construction of a complete and self-contained system 
of legal norms and the subsumption of every possible case under a gapless system, was 
imported into the field of public law by C.F. v. Gerber who had begun his academic career 
as a private lawyer before shifting to public law砂 Labandis regarded as "the intellectual 
executor of Gerber's testament (der geistige Testamentsvollstrecker Gerbers),"51) because 
he adopted Gerber's method and successfully applied it to the Constitution of the newborn 
German empire. 
It is not too much, therefore, to say that Lauterpacht's methodology, namely his 
program to construct a complete international legal system by which a judge can legally 
and objectively settle every international dispute, not only shared elements with Laband's, 
but also was a relative of German legal positivism in general. Acknowledging this 
connection, we would no longer be surprised to see that Lauterpacht drew on Windscheid's 
Pandekten, a masterpiece of German positivism, to reinforce his theory of analogy52). 
From here, we should investigate the theory behind Lauterpacht's attitude toward two 
kinds of positivism. He decidedly rejected the positivist doctrine in international law, which 
regards the will of the State as "the ultimate and exclusive source of law"53l and which 
would necessarily admit a gap in international law. On the other hand, he accepted the 
method of positivism "in other branches of law," which aims at constructing a complete and 
self-contained legal system. It may be helpful to refer to Wieacker's classification of 
positivism into either legal scientific positivism (den rechtswissenschaftlichen Positivismus) 
or statutory positivism (den Gesetzespositivismus). The latter is based on "the conviction 
that every law should be produced by the legislator of a State and exhausted in its 
commands."54) This State Will doctrine should be theoretically distinguished from 
positivism as a method of legal science, which "derives the legal rules and their application 
exclusively from system, concepts and theorems of legal sciences, without conceding law-
48) Ibid., p.43. 
49) Ibid., p.436. 
50) Gerber's research programme both as a private lawyer and as a public lawyer is explained in detail m: 
Wilhelm, op.cit. n.46, especialy at pp.91-93/pp.133-152. Stoleis concisely describes "the methodological 
change in the public law" accomplished by Gerber: Stolies, op.cit. n.31, p.331-337. 
51) Stoleis, ibid, p.341. 
52) Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies, p.85, footnote 1. 
53) Ibid., p.43. 
54) "[die]⑯ erzeugung, clas ales Recht vom statlichen Gesetzgeber erzeugt werde und sich in seinen Befehlen 
erschi:ipfe"(Wieacker, op.cit. n.45, p.432). 
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making or law-changing authority to the non-juristic evaluation and objectives."55) 
Just as Hans Kelsen, a self-acknowledged positivist56) and teacher of Lauterpacht57), 
severely criticized the State Will doctrine58), so did Lauterpacht refute the State Will 
doctrine called "positivist doctrine in international law" or "the doctrine of rigid positivism" 
which was an aspect of "the doctrine of sovereignty,". The theories of Gerber and Laband 
might be partly rejected by Lauterpacht59), insofar as they based law on the will of the 
State. As we have seen above, however, there is a good reason for saying that Lauterpacht 
accepted the essence of their methodology. 
4. Conclusion 
I am not concerned with the distinctions between different meanings of the term 
"positivism". After al, enumerating al these definitions, if possible, would only further 
confuse the term's meaning, and probably make it insignificant. Instead, it is more fruitful 
to identify one significant sense of the term and then construct the relevant doctrinal 
history. 
From this point of view, Lauterpacht's definition of positivism, or "the positivist 
doctrine," is of litle significance, because today it seems that only a few international 
lawyers hold the view that "the will of the State is the ultimate and exclusive source of law." 
Maybe the definition has hardly ever been theoretically relevant, for Lauterpacht himself 
pointed out that so-called "positivist" writers on international law had not consistently 
adhered to the State Will doctrine.60) 
On the other hand, the methodological argument concerning the usefulness and 
applicability of a complete and self-contained system of legal norms has played a 
considerable part in the doctrinal history of international law. The argument about 
justiciability between Morgenthau and Lauterpacht, as discussed above, should be regarded 
55) "[Der rechtswissenschaftliche Positivismus ableitet] die Rechtssiitze und ihre Anwendung ausschliesslich aus 
System, Begriffen und Lehrsatzen der Rechtswissenschaft…, ohne ausserjuristischen .. Wertungen und Zwecken 
rechtserzeugende oder rechtsiindemde Kraft zuzugestehen" (ibid.,p.431). 
56) "Jetzt, da ich, die Resultate meiner monographischen Vorarbeiten zusammenfassend und erganzend, ein 
System der Allgemeinen Staatslehre versuche, sehe ich deutlicher als friher, wie sehr meine eigene Arbeit auf 
der grosser Vorgiinger ruht; fuhle ich mich inniger als bisher jener Richtung staatstheoretischer Erkenntnis 
eingeglierdert, als deren bedeutendste Vertreter in Deutschland Karl Friedrich von Gerber, Paul Laband und 
Georg Jellinek genannt werden miissen"(Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Julius Springer, 1925, Vorrede). 
57) Kelsen himself wrote, "Hersh Lauterpacht was one of my best students when I was teaching General Theory 
of State and Austrian Constitutional Law at the Law School of the University of Vienna, immediately after the 
First World War" (A tribute to Lauterpacht from Kelsen, European Journal of International Law, vol.8, 1997, 
p.309, originally published in 1961). 
58) Kelsen, op.cit. n.56, pp.71-76. 
59) Laband has occasionally been criticized for his founding of statutory positivism, but his methoddology cannot 
be reduced to it. See: Pauly, op.cit., n.36, pp.186-192. 
60) Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies, pp.51-54. 
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as an expression of the methodological argument in the realm of international law. Brierly's 
insistence of the necessity of a so-called peaceful change for securing the redress of a 
"legitimate grievance" against the legal status quo is closely related to the prior discussion 
of the limited function of international justice as well as the limited applicability of the legal 
system.61) Stone's criticism of Lauterpacht was also largely concerned with the positivist 
premise of a gap less legal system. 62) 
Whether or not the positivist method of constructing a complete system of legal norms 
without reference to non-juristic elements is useful and effective, has been and will continue 
to be an essential problem for international lawyers. In my view, the entire project of 
international law aims to apply legal thought to international phenomena in order to 
articulate them and thus make them controllable. As long as the success of the project, i.e. 
the effective application of legal thought to international problems, does not seem self-
evident, we should ask ourselves whether and how legal thought, most of which has been 
historically developed in internal private law, can truly be applied to them. 
In considering such questions, the methodological argument about the usefulness of 
pure juristic thought is deeply relevant. It would therefore be more fruitful to understand 
"positivism" in the methodological sense, and to count Lauterpacht among the positivists. 
Then we would more clearly comprehend the historical and present meaning of arguments 
about his methodology. 
This reserch was supported by Kansai Univesity's Overseas Research Program for the year of 2006. 
61) J.L.Brierly, "International Law and Resort to Armed Force", The Basis of Obligation in International Law, 
Clarendon Pres, 1958, pp.230-241, originaly published in 1932; The Law of Nations, Clarendon Pres, 1928, 
pp.184-190. Later he became critical of the oportunistic argument of peaceful change but did not change his 
insistence upon some alternatives to judicial setlement of disputes, because "[t]he disatisfaction of a state 
with the status quo raises a question which is not a judicial one, and cannot be turned into a judicial question 
by adopting judicial methods of procedure"(The Law of Nations, Clarendon Pres, 5th ed., 195, p.292). 
62) Julius Stone, "Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the international Community", The British Year Book 
of International Law, 1959(1960), pp.124-161. 
